State and Agriculture in Africa: A Case of Means and Ends by Mars, Theo
State and Agriculture in Africa: A Case of Means and Ends
Theo Mars
I am concerned in this article with the issue of how best
to explore the inner world of the state to help us
understand its effects on the social world outside it.
The internal world of the state is constituted by the
coexistence of, first, a political leadership, second, a
body of permanent servants of the state and, third, a
body of citizens with political rights and status. The
inner workings of the state consist of the interaction
within and between these categories of people. The
issue, then, is how most fruitfully to understand that
interaction and its consequences for improving state
performance.
The central issue in the emerging debate about
Africa's agricultural crisis is not about methods of
cultivation or the changes which need to be made to
them [cf. Berry 1984]. It is not, in a real sense, about
agriculture at all. The essence of the problem lies
elsewhere, in an all-pervasive scepticism about the
only social mechanism capable of responding to the
situation in both the short and the longer run. There is
a problem about the state in Africa: it doesn't work.
What was once seen as the solution is now the problem
[World Bank 1984].
This corrosive doubt about the capacity of the state to
cope with the tasks ahead is based on three
conclusions drawn from the experience of African
states since independence. There is first of all the
perception of an inability to attain goals that public
organisations have set. Secondly, there is the gross
abuse of state resources for personal advantage; the
state is treated by official and citizen alike as 'an object
of plunder' [Austin 1984:31]. Thirdly, state activity is
often not merely ineffective, but often startlingly
disruptive and destructive, making life more difficult
by undermining existing arrangements without
putting anything in their place [Apeldoorn 1981;
Coutson 1982]. In combination, these three factors
result in a vicious cycle of repeated failure followed by
response which may be more coercive but not
necessarily any more effective.
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Few people would deny that there is a serious problem
of 'implementation' [Pressman and Wildawsky 1973]
in Africa, whether this is put in the form of saying that
'the resources that are available may not be deployed
efficiently, nor are officials as able, well-trained or
diligent as their jobs require' [Jackson and Rosberg
1982:3 1] or talking about 'the failure of the state to
enforce the logic of its own strategies on the people
(who) are supposed to execute them' [Beckman
1984:37]. Even before they were highlighted by the
problems of famine relief, there were plenty of
examples of disastrous situations on which to draw.
Famine has merely shown up more dramatically the
inability of states to cope with the problems of the
historically remarkably successful food production
systems of Africa.
There have been over the last 10 years a number of
cases that illustrate the weakness and potentially
disruptive and harmful effects of state activity: the
return to natural vegetation of large tracts of
agricultural land, such as the state sisal plantations in
Tanzania; valuable farming land in Kenya which is not
cultivated, but owned for speculative purposes by
politicians; the destruction of coffee plants by farmers
in East Africa; reports of armed guards preventing the
movement of food across district boundaries in
Kenya; extraordinary situations in which in places like
Ghana, famous for its consumer markets, urban
consumers spend the larger part of their day hunting
for food; cases in which people trading in food are
tried by People's Courts, as in Ghana, or put in
detention camps as economic criminals, as in
Tanzania; countries such as those in the Sahel in which
government is so weak or weakened that foreign aid
agencies form a kind of state-within-a-state in direct
control of short and long term solutions; agricultural
projects, like some of those in Nigeria, in which a
self-conscious attempt is made, not to link up with the
local agrarian bureaucracy, but to bypass it
altogether; reports of quite massive movement of food
by criminal gangs across national boundaries, such as
that between Zambia and Tanzania; and quite bizarre
scenes such as those surrounding the marketing of
cocoa in Ghana in which the authorities in charge
happily indulge themselves with crates of whisky and
entertainments by bands of actors and actresses while
apparently unconcerned that they are, in Douglas
Rimmer's apt word 'garotting' the source of their own
wealth [Rimmer 1983:249].
These are cases that need to be confronted because
they leave an unresolved question mark against
anything which may now be done with African
agriculture. An understanding of this failure of
implementation comes before discussion of substantive
policy. There seems little point in any reflection on
appropriate policies: whatever they are, something
quite different from what is intended will happen,
much of it useless, some of it worse.
We need, in fact, to move away from an immediate
concern with issues of policy towards issues of state
organisation. It is no longer viable to work out policies
and assume that the apparatus that carried out these
policies can be designed for optimal functionality and
brought into being by fiat. We need to move away,
too, from the obsession with 'resources', with an all-
consuming interest in the quantity of manpower,
expertise or money devoted to specific ends, towards
more understanding of how they are used. Before we
choose good policies, we need to choose good forms of
organisation. We need to know how to regenerate
public organisation in Africa.
Politics versus Development?
The regeneration of public organisation in Africa is far
more difficult that it might first appear. There is not
only a practical problem but also one of under-
standing, of analysis and diagnosis. We need to
develop a way to understand the interstices of the
state. What, according to those who know most about
it, will we find?
I shall focus on three accounts here - by Dennis
Austin (1984), Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg
(1982), and Christopher Clapham (1985). They will be
recognised by students of African politics as the most
important attempts in recent years to provide an
overview of the African state, a statement of its most
basic features, and are attempting to explain these.
They might be said to convey the conventional
wisdom of this field of study.
These analysts view the organisation and action of
African states as a response to the imperatives of
power in a context where that power is 'fragile', not yet
'institutionalised', because of a 'disjunction between
the state and any shared social values' [Clapham
1985:40]. The state is almost a foreign body of society.
In the absence of any firm foundations to political
power, every state act is devoted to the maintenance of
control of ruler over state and of state over society by
means of bribery, manipulation, the creation of
dependence and coercion. We cannot be surprised to
find that the developmental role of the state is
peripheral. It is in fact naive to expect from African
states 'a rational and concerted assault on problems of
underdevelopment' or 'public organisational
rationality' [Jackson and Rosberg 1982:23]. If this
analysis were substantially correct, it would exclude
the possibility of a regeneration of public organisation
in Africa, at any rate in the foreseeable future.
The Need for a New Approach to the Analysis
of Institutions
In this article I argue that, especially in Africa, we
cannot explain the politics of the state solely by its
social context [cf Dunn 19781. The outcomes of
political struggles are not a mere barometer of the
impact of social forces. Political outcomes are shaped
by the individual and corporate interests and views of
state functionaries; the responsiveness of states to the
needs and demands of its citizens is selective and states
can set out to block and manipulate those interests.
There are internal as well as external determinants of
state conduct. If the aim is to understand how states
can change the societies they govern, and not merely
reflect their current condition, it is necessary to
identify and analyse these determinants.
The political analysis here examined gives centrality to
'power' - understood as control, as the capacity to
extract obedience. The analysis depends on the
distinction between a situation in which obedience is
unproblematically extended because an obligation to
do so is accepted by those who obey, and one in which
obedience has to be extracted by the threat of force or
the inducement of personal advantage. The object of
obedience in the first case is some collective entity like
the state, nation, church, clan, village or tribe; in the
second, it is some specific individual. The argument is
that allegiance of the first kind does indeed exist in
Africa but not vis-a-vis the state. The state is a
complete moral vacuum [Ekeh 1975]. 'Power' when
examined turns out to be a description of the lack of
the existence of an institutional framework for
political relationships.
The advantage of this analysis lies in its ability to draw
together most of the identified ills of African political
life, experienced to a greater or lesser extent in
particular states: the dominant role of a coercive and
manipulative relationship between politicians and
state functionaries, on the one hand, and citizens on
the other, a personal relationship which takes priority
over any right or obligation involved in the
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relationship; the prevalence of the same sort of
relationship within and between political leaderships
and the corps of officials; the lack of effectiveness of
any sanction for the neglect of obligations; the
consequent irrelevance of the performance or lack of
performance of any duty or task, or of the actual
outcomes of any activity; the reluctance of producers
to engage in any market transaction, whether with the
state or privately, because of the lack of ability to
ensure the performance of future obligations entered
into in an economic relationship; the reliance on
institutional frameworks of kin and clan to define
rights and duties in relationships, whether to escape
state power where it still exists [Hyden's 'economy of
affection'] or as a response to the 'deflation of state
power' [Chazan 1983] where it does not. These
problems are all shown to be essentially a breakdown
in the institutional fabric which enables individuals to
enter into future obligations and rely on others to
perform theirs. It is a problem which affects market
relationships just as much as transactions with the
state: the former cannot in these circumstances be
regarded as an alternative to the latter.
This is, I think, quite helpful. The problems start with
the attempt to suggest causal relationships between
these elements. It is establishing some convincing
causal texture which explains the success and failure of
institutional ordering that is the key to understanding
the present situation in Africa. The nature of that
causal texture depends on which particular account of
the nature and origins of institutions is adopted. There
are radically different views on this isssue.
There is a practical as well as a theoretical imperative
behind this demand for a convincing causal analysis of
institutions. Strategies for what is to be done now with
the state depend, implicitly or explicitly, on at least
some sense of what is and is not flexible in the
situation. Those who recommend new policies make
the implicit assumption that it is possible to implement
them. Behind each policy stand assumptions about the
determinants of institutional structure and
development.
The conventional view of the African state as outlined
above, depends on a particular idea of what
institutions are, viz, as the point at which the values of
a culture are translated into feelings of moral
obligation to conform to rules of social interaction.
This analysis reflects a deeply entrenched tradition in
the study of Africa which defines its most fundamental
characteristic as the conflict of cultures. The culture
supposedly embodied in state and market is something
new and alien, thus there is nothing surprising in the
ineffectiveness of state institutions - they are simply
never translated into a moral experience. Hence the
continual emphasis on the significance of the fact that
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African states are 'new' (the themes are ably
summarised by Tordoff 1984). Cultural differences
have great significance to these writers because they
are seen as determinants of institutional development.
Since deep cultural change is not easily achieved, the
causal texture of the situation is a very constrained one.
The work of Robert Bates [and others: Rothschild and
Curry 1978] is of central significance precisely since it
implies a different analysis of social institutions,
rather than building a case for 'free market' policies.
The significance lies, first, in largely ignoring the
whole apparatus of the 'tradition vs modernity' school
of thought and hence the theorists of the European
transition of modernity. Second, it is an analysis in
which culture does not play the central role. Thirdly, it
shows, quite unlike conventional neoclassical economic
analysis, an awareness of the possible utility of
institutional frameworks other than that of the
competitive market. The point of this kind of analysis
is to show how institutions arise out of the self-
interested interaction of a multitude of individual
economic agents. This is quite compatible with the
notion that 'just as Adam Smith's invisible hand .
leads economic agents to reach Pareto-optimal
competitve equilibrium, it can also lead them to create
social institutions that will facilitate their interaction
when competitive outcomes are not optimal' [Schotter
1982:4].
This view of institutions is a distinctively 20th century
one with its origins in the work of Karl Menger. My
aim in this article is to explore the potential of another
distinctively 20th century tradition of institutional
analysis, perhaps the one most dominant in political
theory. It, too, involves the initial step of rejecting the
culturalist framework and accepting that, at any rate
in this century, institutions have to be built not by
using moral restraint to suppress self-interest but by
basing them on it. The key concept of that tradition is
that of 'organisation', understood as the activity of
assembling the means for the pursuit of collective
purposes by the carefully arranged juxtaposition of
individual purposes [Wohn 1960:Ch 9].
In the rest of this article, I shall explain the relevance of
an organisational perspective to our understanding of
African states. This approach needs justification
because it emerged out of the very different task of
thinking about what was fundamentally new about the
politics of the first world in this century. Yet there is a
case to be made, I think, for seeing organisational
theories as central to the analysis of African states.
The Organisational Texture of Modern States
The organisational conception of modern politics
begins by asserting that it is the dominant characteristic
of 20th century states that the people from which they
are composed (whether they are rulers, public servants
or citizens) are combined into a multitude of
organisations and relate to each other as organisations.
Thus power becomes a derivative of the capacity to
organise politically. The state responds to the
demands of its citizens not as individuals or groups,
but as organised interests. One social group will be
better treated than another because it is easier to
organise. Fundamental social conflicts (like those of
class or region) will be organised out of existence; the
only threat to the state comes from those revolut-
ionaries who have managed to develop themselves
into an 'organisational weapon'. Institutions come to
depend upon the power of organisation, not vice
versa. Numbers cease to count in physical conflict; a
small well-organised army will smash a far larger
number of opponents. Ideologies have to transform
themselves into programmes for the state-induced
reform of private organisations [Wohn 1960:Ch 9].
There are, however, two sides to the phenomenon of
the organisational state. On the one hand, there is its
role as an essential tool for human emancipation
[Lindblom 1977], capable of achievements quite
beyond the capacity of the 'self-organisation of the
poor' [Gran 1983] on a local level, or the 'magic of the
market' on a national one. But it is also an experience
which is full of dangers and of the costs of failure. It is
entirely wrong to assume that, like some startling new
technological device which needs only to be installed
to work wonders for ever, organisation eradicates
problems. It has not been like that for us, nor for the
peoples of Africa.
There is also between us, sooner or later, a common
experience of the failure of organisations: of the
accumulation of unintended consequences and
counterproductive side-effects, ofmassive rigidity and
failure to come to terms with new needs and
circumstances, the sinister presence of entrenched
interests that block all room for manoeuvre [Allison
1971; Burns and Stalker 1961; Crozier and Friedberg
1980]. The core of that problem seems to be one of
maintaining performance over time: the same
structure that once seemed successful may, over time,
become pathological. With organisations we get the
benefits now, but unless we are careful, we have to pay
a heavy cost later.
Why Organisations Get Sick, But Don't
Necessarily Die
That organisations grow old, rigid, oppressive and
useless is understandably not something that those
who propose to transform the Third World with their
assistance have gone out of their way to stress. But if
we recognise that the sorts of pathology encountered
in Africa are inherent in a shared experience of the
domination of the organisational imperative, the
agenda of issues which emerges has much in common
with that in our own societies. That agenda locates the
potential for pathology in the fact of organisation
itself, not in the delusions, venality and incompetence
of individuals. lt is a critique which is ruthless about
the potential conseqences of wrong organisational
choices, far greater than those that a sensitive and
informed sceptic like the late Bernard Schaffer
envisaged.
It is worth briefly capturing at least some of the main
themes ofthe critique. The basic argument asserts that
both the benefits and drawbacks of the organised
pursuit of collective purpose arise from the fact that
formal organisations are artifacts, artificial beings.
Though they are constructed from individuals, they
are combined and transformed into something quite
different from their raw material. Formal organisation
displaces some of the fundamental characteristics
which enable individuals to choose and act in the
world. Organisational rationality displaces individual
rationality, organisational values displace social
values, organisational knowledge displaces the ways
in which individuals learn and use information to cope
with uncertainty.
What is important about these artificial beings is their
potential not merely for particular 'failures', but for
sustained reinforcing failure, in which the corrective
actions adopted use the very means that produced the
failure itself. I am thinking here for example, of
situations in which problems like over-centralisation
are corrected by centrally controlled programmes of
compulsory decentralisation, or that process of
infinite regress in which lack of coordination produces
institutions for coordination which in their turn need
coordinating with the institutions which need
coordinating, etc. There are also the more familiar
examples in which organisational action is consistently
guided by wrong or inadequate information because
the organisational production and distribution of
knowledge reproduces erroneous assumptions, self-
fulfilling prophecies, and ignorance of vital factors
[Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979]. When artificially created
giants make mistakes they are correspondingly giant.
The other fundamental element of the critique of
organisation refers to the relation between this
artificial creature and its human and social com-
ponents. People continue to be individuals, with their
own aspirations and interests; social and cultural
institutions, technological imperatives and economic
realities continue to shape them. It would be tempting
to assume that an organisation must respond to the
needs of the individuals of which it is composed, that it
must practise the values of its society or that it is
19
constrained by the need to compete on the market. But
things are not quite as simple as that. As a species, this
artificial man may, as the predominant metaphor in
the field puts it, survive by adaptation to his
environment, but he is fiendishly clever about shaping
the environment to which he has to adapt.
There are points at which organisations change back
into recognisably human shape, when promotions are
discussed or goods sold to customers on the market.
This is something that our artificial man is capable of
coping with. All the rules of organisational design and
management science can be boiled down to the single
doctrine that the shape of the organisation should give
absolute priority to these points of danger and the
minimisation of their consequences. How that is done
is quite simple: by the creation of monopolies, large
and small. Organisations are structured to survive by
creating situations in which they depend on no-one in
particular and someone does depend on them, in
particular. The creation of monopolies is what
organisation is all about: the very principle of
specialisation and differentiation ofskills, the division
of labour, creates a set of functionaries highly
dependent on one another and distributes power to
those in a good position to make the necessary
strategic moves to exploit those dependencies [Crozier
and Friedberg 1980; Hickson et al. 1971].
The point about all these features is that they are
deeply ambiguous, the potential for good and for bad
are inseparable. Organisations can be too successful at
maintaining themselves; but they can also fail to do so,
the process called 'organisational decline' [Greenhalgh
1982] slowly disintegrating in costly death agonies,
such as those of the 'deflation of state power' in
Ghana, so strikingly analysed by Naomi Chazan
[1983].
Focusing on the State
Two points about the state may be helpful in getting to
grips with seemingly intractable problems of state
organisation in some African countries. The state as a
whole is a chain of linked relationships; the most
critical points lie at the joins between the principal
parts: between political leaders and administrators,
between administrators and technical experts such as
agronomists, doctors or engineers; and between all of
these groups and citizens. If things go wrong at one
point, it can affect every relationship along the chain.
The existing literature on African states supports the
contention that the main problems lie precisely at
these points: the persistent problems in the politics-
administration relation (the problem of 'political
interference' with the workings of administration; the
problematic relationship between party and admini-
stration in places like Nkrumah's Ghana and
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Nyerere's Tanzania); the fuzzy and sometimes chaotic
relationship between central administration and
service departments and the parastatals, the grossly
unsatisfactory relationships between the latter and the
public [Tordoff l984:Ch 6].
Our analysis must focus on the interconnections and
not on the parts themselves, seen in isolation. The
disorders of each part are quite possibly the disorders
of wrong connection with the others: like the
degneration of either party or administration, or both,
by the interminable struggles between them; or the
sacking and looting of public organisations by
politicians bent on using them as election fund-raising
committees, or the relation between the finances of
parastatals and those of the state as a whole. These
problematic relationships are not resolved by isolating
each element and getting that right.
It can be misleading to look at this or that bit of the
state, to study parties, or local government, or
parastatals, or settlement schemes. Wherever one
lands up in the interstices of the state, any particular
bit of it seems more often than not to be organised in a
generally understandable way: one can see the sense of
it being that way. Those intelligible bits don't
necessarily make sense when put together. If one took
something like agricultural extension work for
example, the problems involved in their organisation
can be clarified and a path to their improvement
delineated [Leonard 1977; Mons 1981]. It is when one
tries to understand extension services in the wider
context of public services or the interests mediated
through party, that one has to ask whether what seem
'obstacles' to good extension are not seen by others
involved as essential requirement [Leo 1984].
A second point that may provide some sense of
orientation is the notion that the critical relationships
that make up the state are essentially organisational
ones. It is not helpful to see them as either matters of
personal relationships or as 'institutional' relationships
defined by rights and duties, justified by some general
principle accepted as binding by all parties. We have to
learn to manage without those.
There is not much of value to be gained, for example,
by seeing the relationship between political leaders
and administrators as one of subordination, defined
by the farmers' formal right to command. Bureaucrats
have great power and their relationship to rulers is
much more like that ofan exchange of equals within a
division of labour, notwithstanding constitutional
mythologies. Politicians are leaders, providing a sense
of public purpose, infusing a society with commitment
and direction; administrators have other preoccu-
pations (not only those of personal interest); but if the
relationship goes sour the politicians will be got rid of.
Organisational relationships are tools, instruments to
bring into line individual and collective purposes,
making them grow dynamically with one another and
preventing their separation. In that respect they are
just like market relations. Organisation is one way of
coping with the overwhelming presence of private and
partial interest: the visible hand of organisation is the
alternative to the invisible hand of the market. It
exploits the potentialities of putting those private
interests into different combinations and making them
serve a purpose beyond themselves.
Africa: Their Problems and Ours
I have argued in this article the value of identifying the
central problems of African states as those inherent in
all 20th century states. This is not to deny differences
that are real enough - these are merely put to one side
while an attempt is made to work out what sorts of
problems there are. But I think it worth working on
the hypothesis - and it is no more - that in their
essence those problems are a version of the problems
of first world states: of an archaic state organisation in
need of fundamental repair. Africa is not the only
place with a shrinking, dying political arena, systems
of personal rule, large, blundering, pointless bureau-
cracies, increasing authoritarianism in the face of state
failure, inability to cope with the world market and a
loss of coherent public purpose. The resolution of the
problems of Africa must start with the recognition
that they are another form of our own. If we do not
accept that, we may be looking now at Africa, not as
our past, but as our future.
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